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Be Taken to Counteract Them
JOHN
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MURPHY*

Everyone would agree that the United States currently faces extremely
serious national security threats; however, there is some disagreement as to
what actually constitutes a national security threat.' Is it-or should it belimited to military threats, or should it have a more expansive focus and
include economic, environmental, and other important facets of life? Ideally,
I would favor the more expansive focus, because I certainly agree that
economic and environmental threats can endanger national security. But
because of time and space limitations, this article will consider only military
threats to national security.
There is little, if any, resistance now to including military threats from
violent non-state actors in addition to military threats from other nationstates. By way of violent non-state actors, this article will use as its primary
examples, the Islamic State, Al Qaeda, and other forms of Islamic jihadists.
The nation-states included in this article, pertaining to national security
threats to the United States, are China, Russia, and North Korea.
I.

Traditional Threats to U.S. National Security: Nation-States

Traditionally, and historically, primary threats to U.S. national security
have emanated from other nation-states. This is hardly surprising, because
many, indeed most, nation-states regard the development of resources
* Professor of Law Emeritus, Villanova University, and member, External Advisory Board,
The International Lawyer. I am grateful for the technical assistance of Mira Baric, my
administrative assistant, and the research assistance of Lori Strickler Corso, an electronic
services librarian and legal research instructor at the Villanova University School of Law. I also
want to thank Professor Marc I. Steinberg, Editor-in-Chief of The InternationalLawyer, for his
kind invitation to contribute an article to this 50th anniversary issue.
1. In the United States, the concept of national security developed mostly after World War
II, and focused initially on military might. For example, in 1943, Walter Lippmann, a leading
commentator, defined national security in terms of war, stating that "a nation has security when
it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to
maintain them by war." JOSEPH J. Romm, DEFINING NATIONAL SECURITY: THE
NONMILITARY ASPECTS 122 (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993). The concept of
national security has now expanded to cover non-military facets, with references to economic
security, energy security, environmental security, etc.
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adequate to allow them to resort to military armed force, when vital to
national interest. As we shall see later in this article, one of the many
extraordinary, and challenging, aspects of the Islamic State is its ability to
use military force in conventional battles-which quite often defeats the
forces of nation-states.
Sadly, there are surely more than three nation-states that, at least under
certain circumstances, might constitute a threat to the national security of
the United States. But for reasons that I hope will become clear, China, the
Russian Federation, and North Korea, all deserve special attention. We
begin with China.
A.

CHINA

Many commentators, when considering whether China constitutes a
military threat to U.S. national security, adopt what might be called a
quantitative approach. That is, they focus on the number and type of
military assets available in each country. According to this approach, if
China compares favorably to the United States, it means that China
constitutes a military threat to the United States. A 2008 article adopting
this approach concludes that China does not constitute a military threat to
U.S. national security.2 The authors add some sarcasm to their conclusion:
"Only those who believe that Fu Manchu is alive and well in the Middle
Kingdom and fulfilling his dreams of world domination through a large and
aggressive army, air force, and navy still subscribe to a notion that China
poses a global military threat."3 But the article noted above was written
eight years ago, and the Chinese have greatly increased, and improved, their
military assets; thus, it is still probable that China has limited ability to
project its military power on a global basis.4 But China's possible military
threat to U.S. national security is primarily regional, rather than global, in
nature.
To illustrate, major tensions have arisen between the United States and
China because of China's extravagant territorial claims over the South China
Sea. The South China Sea is part of the Pacific Ocean, and encompasses an
area from the Singapore and Malacca Straits to the Strait of Taiwan (the
2. After comparing the air, naval, and weapons capabilities of China with those of the United
States, the authors conclude that categorically "China is not a military threat to the United
States." See Henry Rosemont & John Feffer, Is China a Threat?, FOREIGN POLICY IN Focus
(Feb. 6, 2008), http://fpif.org/is-china-a-threat.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Stephen G. Brooks & William C. Wohlforth, The Once and Future Superpower:
Why China Won't Overtake the United States, 95 FOREIGN AFFAIRs 3 (May/June 2016). (In which
the authors claim that "Economic growth no longer translates as directly into military power as
it did in the past, which means that it is now harder than ever for rising powers to rise and
established ones to fall . . . . Even though the United States' economic dominance has eroded
from its peak, the country's military dominance is not going anywhere, nor is the globespanning alliance structure that constitutes the core of the existing liberal international order
(unless Washington unwisely decides to throw it away)").
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strait that separates the island of Taiwan from mainline China). China
essentially claims territorial sovereignty over the entire South China Sea.
This claim, however, comes into direct conflict with the territorial claims
made by its "smaller and weaker neighbors," especially Vietnam and the
Philippines. All of these nation-states make "claim[s] to islands, coral reefs,
and lagoons in waters rich in fish and potential gas and oil reserves. China's
recent construction of artificial islands .

.

. complete with airstrips and radar

stations," plus neighboring nation-state's naval patrols "challenging Beijing's
vast territorial claims have raised concern that the strategically important
waters could become a flashpoint."5
The United States has made no territorial claims, and has resisted China's
claims, to the waters of the South China Sea. But on April 19, 2016, the
U.S. military protested China's landing of a military jet on a man-made
island in South China Sea.6 U.S. military officials have said that any attempt
by China to fly military aircrafts from the man-made island would not deter
U.S. flights over the area7 because the United States believes that these manmade islands are not islands entitled to territorial seas or exclusive economic
zones under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982.8
Interestingly, China is a party to the U.N. Convention, but the United
States is not, due to their objections to the deep sea-bed provisions of the
Convention. The United States, however, claims that most of the other
provisions of the Convention are binding under customary international law.
It is noteworthy that the Philippines has challenged China's territorial
claim over the South China Sea before a U.N. arbitration tribunal.9 But
China has refused to recognize the tribunal's jurisdiction, and has indicated
that they will not carry out any decision the tribunal might issue against
them.io Indeed, "China claim[ed] 'indisputable sovereignty' over the
territory, and rejects arbitration as 'a political provocation in the guise of
law.'"ii
Although the Philippines has been described as being "decades away from
having a credible defense force," the United States and the Philippines have
entered into an agreement that allows the United States to build facilities at
5. The Associated Press, SOUTH CHINA SEA WATCH: Tussle over plane; Russia backs China,
(Apr. 25, 2016, 8:55 AM), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/south-china-seawatch-tussle-over-plane-russia-backs-china.
6. See, e.g., Paul Elliott, South China Sea: US bomber angers Bejing with Spratly islandsflypast,
THE VILLAGES SUNTIMES (Dec. 27 2015), http://thevillagessuntimes.com/2015/12/27/southchina-sea-us-bomber-angers-beijing-with-spratly/.
7. Id.
8. See generally The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397.
9. See Floyd Whaley, Eye on China, U.S. and Philippines Ramp Up Military Alliance, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 12, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/13/world/asia/philippines-southchina-sea-ash-carter.html.
10. See id.
11. See id.
CNSNEWS
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five Philippine military bases.12 This will spread more American troops,
planes, and ships across the island nation, which some analysts suggest could
"tilt the balance of power" in the South China Sea region.13 Be that as it
may, the agreement and planned U.S.-Philippine joint military exercises
may, at a minimum, cause China to be more cautious in its relations with the
Philippines.
In the past, the Taiwan Strait has been a "dangerous flash point for
conflict."14 Tensions between the People's Republic of China (CPRC), the
government of the Chinese mainland, the Republic of China (ROC), and the
government of Taiwan, date back to the end of the Chinese Civil War, when
the Chinese Communist Party defeated the losing Nationalist Party (the
Kuomingtang, or KMT) which fled to Taiwan.15
The cross-strait relationship was characterized by tensions and periodic
crises during the 1950s and 1960s, and the ROC, in 1954 signed an
alliance treaty with the United States. United States. Washington did
not establish diplomatic [relations] with the PRC until 1979, at which
point it severed diplomatic ties, and abrogated its alliance with the
ROC.16
As a result of this tension, the United States does not have any formal
diplomatic ties with Taiwan, and therefore, does not have a treaty obligation
to come to Taiwan's defense if it is attacked.
While "Taiwan prepared for its first direct presidential election in 1996,"
China increasingly feared that Taiwan was moving toward formal
independence, and consequently, "a prolonged crisis erupted in the Taiwan
Strait."17 China not only conducted "missile tests in [the] waters near
Taiwan," but also threatened to invade the island.18 Former U.S President
Bill Clinton, however, defused the crisis when he decided to "deploy two
[armed] aircraft carrier battle groups into the area," and was ready to come
to Taiwan's defense if necessary.1 9 But it is unclear whether today a U.S.
President would be willing to send aircraft carriers to defend Taiwan, in a
like manner, because China has developed advanced cruise and ballistic
missiles that could pose a significant threat in any future conflicts with the
United States.20 According to former Chief of U.S. Naval Operations,
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See Scott L. Kastner, Is the Taiwan Strait Still a Flash Point?: Rethinking the Prospectsfor
Armed Conflict between China and Taiwan, 40 INT'L SEC. 54, 54 (Winter 2015/2016).
15. See id.
16. Id. at 56
17. Id. at 57.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Kastner, supra note 14, at 70.
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Admiral Jonathan Greenert, China could pose a great threat to the United
States, especially if the conflicts were in proximity to China.21
In addition, it is unclear whether the status of Taiwan poses a current
threat of armed conflict. In January 2016, Taiwan elected Tsai Ing-Wen, its
first female President. During her pre-presidential career, Tsai has expressed
her support for Taiwan becoming independent; however, there are
indications that she will be cautious in expressing such views now that she
has become president, especially because China has stated on several
occasions that it would invade Taiwan if Taiwan were to declare itself
independent.22 Moreover, Tsai's immediate presidential predecessor, Ma
Ying-jeou, first elected in 2008, pursued a "d6tente with Beijing," in which
during his time in office, China and Taiwan concluded "twenty-one
agreements covering, among other things, economic and cultural
cooperation."23 Also, cross-strait trade increased by almost 100 percent. 24
All of this has benefited both China and Taiwan, however, it is highly
probable that many of these benefits would disappear if conflict were to
erupt, especially if it were to escalate into a war between the United States
and China.
One major risk that is hard to measure is miscalculation. Miscalculation is
present in the United States' relations with China, and as we shall see in the
next section of this article, may have an even greater presence in the United
States' relations with Russia. If China were to conclude, for example, that
the United States is no longer committed to defend Taiwan in the event of
an armed attack, the risk of China deciding to use armed force to
incorporate Taiwan within its territorial sovereignty would increase.
Similarly, with respect to the South China Sea, there is considerable danger
of various miscalculations in relations between China and its dealings with
the United States, as well as with China's neighbors, such as Vietnam and
the Philippines. The continuing rise of nationalism in China and other
Asian nation-states only exacerbates the problem.
B.

RussiA

In 1991, the month of December was a momentous time for the Soviet
Union (former USSR). On December 8, 1991, "[Boris] Yeltsin, as head of
the Russian Republic, declare[d] Russia's independence in the Minsk Accord,
21. See Bill Gertz, Chinese Missile Forces Post Threat to U.S. in Future Conflict, THE WASH. FREE
(July 28, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://freebeacon.com/national-security/chinese-missileforces-pose-threat-to-u-s-in-future-conflict/.
22. See, e.g., Taiwan protest after officials 'barredby China'at OECD Meet, THE BANGKOK POST,
(Apr. 17, 2016, 7:25 PM), http://www.bangkokpost.com/archive/taiwan-protests-after-officialsbarred-by-china-at-oecd-meet/9393 37.
23. Alexander Bernard & Paul J. Leaf, The U.S., TPP and Taiwan, THE NAT'L INT. (Apr. 24,
2014), http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-us-tpp-taiwan-10300.
24. Id.
BEACON
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which [Yeltsin ] sign[ed] with the Ukrainian and Belorussian republics."25
Yeltsin declared that the USSR, "as a subject of international law and
geopolitical reality no longer exists."26 And on December 26, 1991, the
"Supreme Soviet [formally] recognize[d] the dissolution of the USSR,"
which culminated with "the United States and the Russian Federation
establish[ing] diplomatic relations" on December 31.27 Prior to these
happenings, specifically in 1989 and 1990, the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe became independent, and non-Communist.28 Contested
elections were introduced into the USSR, as were limited versions of
freedom of speech and publication.29
NATO took advantage of the dissolution of the USSR, and expanded its
membership to include those nation-states previously under Soviet control.
On March 12, 1999, the first expansion of NATO took place "with the
addition of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic."30 On March 19,
2004, the "largest single expansion of membership" took place when seven
nation-states: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and
Romania became members.3' To date, "the final expansion of NATO's
membership took place on April 1, 2009," when Albania and Croatia joined
NATO.32 As pointed out by Arthur Downey, with the addition of Albania
and Croatia, since 1949, NATO had expanded from its original membership
from twelve nation-states, to twenty-eight nation-states, over the sixty-year
period.33
Russia challenged the legality of all three NATO expansions on the
ground that the expansions violated promises "that the West made to the
Soviet Union at the time of German reunification, namely that NATO
would not expand eastward."34 In the Russian view, "the USSR was willing
to agree to the unification of Germany"-even as a new, western influenced
Germany within NATO-provided NATO did not move eastward.35 This
argument is problematic because, as Downey has pointed out, "there is no
written evidence-or document-of such a Western agreement to refrain
from the eastern expansion of NATO,"36 and it is highly unlikely that the
West would make such a promise without reducing it to writing for legally
binding effect.
25. ARTHUR T. DOWNEY, THE COLD
(2016).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 190.
28. Id. at 188.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 45.
31. Downey, supra note 25, at 45-46.
32. Id. at 46.
33. Id.
3 4. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.

WAR: LAw, LAWYERS, SPIES AND CRISES

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

app. 1 at 189

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
2017]

PRIMARY NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS FACING THE U.S.

117

The collapse of the Soviet Union had a devastating effect on Russia's
military situation. As one scholar put it:
The Russian military rotted away. In one of the most dramatic
campaigns of peacetime demilitarization in world history, from 1988 to
1994, Moscow's armed forces shrank from five million to one million
personnel. As the Kremlin's defense expenditures plunged from around
$246 billion in 1988 to $14 billion in 1994 . . . . the government
withdrew some 700,000 servicemen from Afghanistan, Germany,
Mongolia, and Eastern Europe. So much had the prestige of the
military profession evaporated during the 1990s that when the nuclear
submarine Kurst sank in Barents Sea in 2000, its captain was earning the
equivalent of $200 per month.37
No doubt in large part because of Russia's greatly weakened military
position after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was initially very
cautious in its use of military force. For example,
from 1991 to 2008, during the presidency of [] Yeltsin, and the first
presidential term of Vladimir Putin, Russia used its scaled-down
military within the borders of the former Soviet Union, largely to
contain, end, or freeze conflicts there. Over the course of the 1990s,
Russian units intervened in ethnic conflicts in Georgia and Moldova
and in the civil war in Tajikistan[-]all minor engagements.38
In its weakened military state, Russia for some time, actually "sought a
partnership with the United States," and cooperation with NATO, when it
came to taking action beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union.39
This led to Russia "joining the peacekeeping operation led by [NATO] in
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996."40 The situation changed, however, in the
mid-1990s, when Russia realized that there was no chance that it could
achieve membership in NATO.4' Russia then "protested vehemently against
[NATO's] eastern expansion, its 1999 bombing campaign in Yugoslavia, and
the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, but Russia's military was too weak to block
any of these moves."42 Instead, Russia relied on its "nuclear deterrent" to
guarantee its "security and sovereignty."43
Vladimir Putin soon adopted a much more aggressive posture. Beginning
in 2008, Putin decreed military reforms, and sponsored a "massive increase
in defense spending to upgrade Russia's creaky military."44
37. Dmitri Trenin, The Revival of the Russian Military, 95 FOREIGN AFFAIRs 23, 23 (May/ June
2016).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Trenin,supra note 37, at 23.
44. Id.
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More recently, Russia has shown a willingness to use force to get what it
wants.
First, in February 2014, Moscow sent soldiers in unmarked uniforms to
wrest control of Crimea from Ukraine, implicitly threatening Kiev with
a wider invasion. It then provided weaponry, intelligence, and
command-and-control support to the pro-Russian separatists in
Ukraine's Donbas region, checking Kiev's attempts to defeat them.
And then, in the fall of 2015, Russia ordered its air and naval forces to
bomb militants in Syria fighting President Bashar al-Assad, intervening
[militarily] in the Middle East for the first time in history.45
It is perhaps time to pause and consider whether this Russian military
build-up and aggressive behavior constitutes a threat to United States
national security. There is no question, of course, that Russia has once again
become a military power after a quarter century of military weakness and
that it has shown a willingness and capacity to compete militarily with
NATO. It is nonetheless debatable whether Russia has become a national
security threat to the United States. Gideon Rose, the Editor of Foreign
Affairs, in his Preface to the Section on Putin'sRussia in the May/ June 2016
issue has stated,
[t]ogether, these articles suggest pessimism about the future of Putin's
regime, which has glaring structural weaknesses and limited prospects
for advancement. But they also suggest that it does not pose a major
imminent threat to world peace and stability. The current chapter of
Russia's story is unlikely to end well, yet external pressure or
provocation seems likely to inflame the situation rather than improve it.
Dealing with such a challenge successfully will require a careful hand
and a combination of firmness, prudence, and patience.46
Sadly, Mr. Rose's view of the current situation may be overly optimistic.
This is because at the time I am writing this article a major crisis is brewing
in the Baltic countries of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.47 According to
reports, "Western allies are preparing to put four battalions-a force of
about 4,000 troops-in Poland and the Baltic countries as part of an effort
by NATO to reinforce its border with Russia as it steps up military
activity."48 U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work said the buildup
was in response to Russian movement of troops right up against the
borders.49 In an interview Mr. Work said "From our perspective, we could
argue this is extraordinarily provocative behavior."50 It is important to note
45. Id.
46. Gideon Rose, Putin's Russia, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May/June 10 (2016).

47. See Julian E. Barnes & Anton Troianovski, NATO Allies Preparingto Put Four Battalions at
the Eastern Border With Russia, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30-May 1, 2016, at AS.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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that Poland and the Baltic countries are members of NATO, and the United
States and other member states of NATO have an international obligation
under article five of the NATO Treaty to come to their aid if they are subject
to an armed attack.5'
As I mentioned above in the section on China, the risk of a miscalculation
by a U.S. adversary is especially worrisome. If the Putin administration
believes that it can engage in aggressive armed force in the Baltic countries
without a military reaction by United States and other NATO members, he
will have made a very serious miscalculation indeed, one that could result in
armed conflict between the United States and Russia. One hopes that this
can be avoided by intensive diplomatic negotiations between the two
countries.
Russia's 2008 war in Georgia was a clear success for Putin.52 According to
one scholar,
Russian forces routed troops loyal to the pro-Western president,
Mikheil Saakashvili, and secured the breakaway republics of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia as Russian protectorate. . . Moscow prevented Nato
(sic) from expanding into a former Soviet state that was flirting with
membership, confirmed its strategic supremacy in its immediate
southern and western neighborhood, and marked the limits of Western
military involvement in the region.53
In the fall of 2015, Russia took a momentous step: it intervened in Syria's
civil war. Prior to this action, Russia had tended to project force only within
the borders of the former Soviet Union.54 But with respect to Syria, Russia
dispatched several dozen aircraft to strike the Islamic State and other antiAssad forces.55 In addition, Russia "established advanced air defense systems
within Syria, sent strategic bombers on sorties over the country from bases
in central Russia, and ordered the Russian navy to fire missiles at Syrian
targets from positions in the Caspian and Mediterranean Seas."56 UN
sources have estimated that the war in Syria has killed over 250,000 people
51. North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243 provides "The
Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America
shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an
armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense
recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so
attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it
deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the
North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall
immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the
Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace
and security."
52. See Trenin, supra note 37, at 24.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 26.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 25.
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and driven 11 million from their homes. 7 The 11 million driven from their
homes have fled to Greece and other countries in Western Europe and
created an enormous refugee problem for these countries.58 The United
States is greatly concerned over the adverse effect that this has had on some
of its closest allies, especially the threat to their national security.
Earlier, in response to reports that President Assad of Syria was using
chemical weapons against the rebels, U.S. President Barack Obama drew a
so-called "red line" against such attacks and threatened military force against
Syrian forces if they used chemical weapons. 59 When there were further
Syrian chemical weapons attacks, however, no U.S. military response was
forthcoming.60 Instead, at Putin's suggestion, the United States and Russia
agreed that international inspectors should destroy Syria's chemical weapons
and Syria agreed to this process. 61 Destruction of the Syrian chemical
weapons supply was completed in June 2014.62
At the time of this writing, a fierce battle for the northern Syrian city of
Aleppo threatened a cease-fire arranged by Russia and the United States.63
There is also fighting in the city of Afrin, northwest of Aleppo, between U.S.
allied Kurds and rebels aligned with Turkey that is hindering the
international effort to destroy the Islamic State.64 The United States'
priority is to destroy the Islamic State. Russia is not opposed to this policy,
but its priority is to help the Assad regime stay in power, and to this end,
Russia is generally battling, with an air campaign, the rebels who are fighting
against Assad, some of whom the United States is backing.
There is no question of the strength of the adversarial relationship that
exists between the United States and Russia. Nonetheless, the cease-fire
arranged by the joint effort of both countries shows that cooperation is
possible if both countries' interests coincide, and both countries have
decided that at the minimum there should be a pause in the armed conflict in
Syria. It is also in the interest of both countries to destroy the Islamic State,
even if at the moment this goal is not Russia's top priority. According to
Reuters, however, Muslim minorities make up 14 percent of Russia's
population, and it is worth remembering that in 1994, Boris Yeltsin sent the
Russian military into Chechnya in an attempt to crush a Muslim separatist
rebellion.65 In light of all this, and the complexity of the challenge posed by
57. U.N. SCOR, 7504 mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7504 (Aug. 17, 2015).
58. Id.
59. Daniel Lembroso & Jeffrey Goldberg, Obama's "Red Line" that Wasn't, THE ATLANTIC
(Mar. 10, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/video/index/473025/syria-red-line-that-wasnt.
60. See Syrian President Bashar al-Assad: Facing Down Rebellion, BBC NEWS (Oct. 21, 2015),
http://www/bbc.com/news/10338256.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See Sam Dagher & Dion Nissenbaum, Aleppo Battle Blunts Truce Effort, WALL ST. J., Apr.
30-May 1, 2016, at A8.
64. Id.
65. Robin Paxton, Arctic Mosque Stays Open but Muslim Numbers Shrink, REUTERS (Apr. 16,
2007), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-muslims-russia-arctic-idUSL1072493620070416.
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Russia to U.S. vital interests, Mr. Rose's advice that this challenge will
"require a careful hand and a combination of firmness, prudence, and
patience" is compelling.66

C.

NORTH KOREA

Speaking of challenges to U.S. vital interests, President Obama has
recently stated that North Korea poses a "massive challenge" for the United
States.67 He reported that the United States is repositioning its missiledefense system "so that even as we try to resolve the underlying problem of
nuclear development inside of North Korea, we're also setting up a shield
that can at least block the relatively low-level threats they are posing right
now."68 Obama told his interviewer, Charlie Rose, that North Korean
leader Kim Jong Un is "personally irresponsible."69 He added, "we could
obviously destroy North Korea with our arsenal, but aside from the
humanitarian costs of that, they are right next door to our vital ally South
Korea."o U.S. efforts to persuade China, North Korea's only ally, have
been modestly successful at best, although China has supported UN
sanctions against North Korea.
At the time of this writing, North Korea was about to hold the seventh
Congress of the governing Workers' Party the next day.:' Meeting for the
first time in a generation, the Congress was expected to cement Mr. Kim's
status as supreme leader.72 The New York Times has aptly summarized Mr.
Kim's ruthlessness:
Mr. Kim was still in his late 20s when the death of his father, Kim Jongil, in 2011 catapulted him to the top of the secretive regime. Outside
analysts who had predicted openness and diplomatic compromise under
his young leadership-Mr. Kim had spent time in Switzerland as a
teenager-had a surprise in store.
The young man had more than 100 senior party officials or generals,
including his own uncle, executed while he also let the Workers' Party
regain its influence on the military. Thousands more were demoted or
banished. He engineered purges with such frequency and ruthlessness
that President Park Geun-hye of South Korea called Mr. Kim's rule a
"reign of terror."
66. See Gideon Rose, supra note 46, at 10.
67. See David Nakamura, Obama: U.S. is 'setting up a Shield to Block North Korean Missiles,
WASH. POST, Apr 26, 2016, at 1.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Choe Sang-Hun, North Korean Leader Seeks to Cement Power, N.Y. TIMES, May 5,
2016, at A4.
72. Id.

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
122

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

[VOL. 50, NO. 1

His main selling point domestically has been his image as a strong
young leader able to arm his country with nuclear weapons. In recent
months, North Korea has tried to bolster that image by reporting
success in a flurry of tests of technologies needed to acquire a nuclear
strike capability, including the test of what it called a submarinelaunched ballistic missile.73
Dealing with North Korea is indeed a "massive challenge" to the national
security interests of the United States. Not only does the United States have
to interpret China's ambiguous policy toward North Korea's threats and
actions, it also has to decide whether the mutual assured destruction (MAD)
doctrine that effectively barred a first strike nuclear policy during the Cold
War will work against North Korea. There is also a serious question
whether the economic sanctions imposed against North Korea will in any
way hinder the development of their nuclear strike capacity. Although Mr.
Kim tries to promote his so-called byungjin policy, which calls for
simultaneously developing achieving both a nuclear arsenal and economic
development, the history of North Korea indicates that if faced with a
choice, it will opt for a nuclear arsenal. During the 1990s, millions of North
Koreans died of hunger during a famine.
II. Now for Something Really Different: Islamic State, Al Qaeda,
and Other Forms of Islamic Jihadism
The U.S. invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003
have been sharply criticized by many commentators and for various reasons.
For example,
[t]he subsequent breakdown of state institutions and the American
occupation's failure to fill the security vacuum caused by the dissolution
of both the army and the Bath Party allowed the Islamic State to gain a
foothold in Iraq where it fought a guerilla war against the United States
and the Shia led government of Nuri al-Maliki.74
Later, in Syria, after civil war erupted in 2011, the Islamic State "began to
morph into the behemoth we see today."75
Initially, the Islamic State became an Al-Qaeda affiliate in Iraq after
swearing allegiance to Osama bin Laden.76 It later broke free from AlQaeda because of disagreements over strategy and methodology.77 Some of
Al-Qaeda's primary characteristics and differences between it and Islamic
State have been described as follows:
73. Id.
74. See Robert Sedgwick, Primeron the Islamic State, CIAO Focus (Oct./Nov. 2015), https://
www.ciaonet.org/attachments/28112/uploads? 1447964567.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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Al-Qaeda is part of a long tradition of ultra-conservative Saliaft
movements with roots in Saudi Arabia and largely informed by the
teachings of Sayyid Qulb, a radical Islamist from Egypt who died in
1966. The group relies heavily on suicide bombers and armed hit
squads to strike at its-mainly western-enemies outside the Middle
East, primarily the United States (e.g., the USS Cole and 9/11 attacks)
and to a lesser extent Europe (e.g. the attack on Charlie Hebdo in
Paris). Al-Qaeda has been highly critical of the Islamic State's televised
beheadings through the years and condemns its violence against the
Shia, which the former views as part of the wider Muslim community
(the umma).
In comparison, the Islamic State (IS) is a hybrid organization that
merged a rogue Al-Qaeda affiliate with elements of the defunct Baath
Party and Iraqi military during the insurgency. Many of the group's top
battlefield tacticians are in fact former military commanders who once
served in Saddam Hussein's army. The group's overall objective is the
establishment, expansion and defense of an Islamic Caliphate through
territorial conquests and by waging jihad against all perceived infidels,
foreign and domestic, including Shiite Muslims. Although IS does
dispatch suicide bombers and armed militants to strike certain targets, it
is more insurgent army and state building enterprise than classic
terrorist organization.71
In other words, the Islamic State can be described as "something really
different" because it has many of the characteristics of a nation-state, and a
very powerful one at that. To be sure, it seeks to establish an Islamic
Caliphate through territorial conquests rather than a new country, but it has
a military force with highly competent commanders, which help it hold its
own against national militaries, often defeating them in individual battles.
Particularly impressive is the Islamic State's effective use of the Internet and
social media to disseminate propaganda in multiple languages.79 Its mass
executions, beheadings, and other shocking atrocities are quickly turned into
finely produced videos.o These videos serve both to keep the Islamic State
in the news and to entice potential recruits who want to be part of something
successfuls1 Also, in the videos, Islamic State spokesmen argue that the
West, specifically the United States, is engaged in a "War on Islam" and has
committed numerous atrocities against individual Muslims as part of this
war. 82 In its early days, the Islamic State relied on funding from wealthy
78. Id.
79. Sedgwick, supra note 74.
80. Id.
8 1. Id.
82. See Aliyah Frumin, ISIS Releases New Propaganda Video Threatening U.S. Troops, MSNBC
(Sept. 17, 2016), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/isis-releases-new-propaganda-video-threaten
ing-us-troops.
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benefactors in the Arabian Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.83 But
in recent years, it has become close to self-sustaining through its control of
oil fields in various locations, such as eastern Syria.84 Through propaganda
and other means the Islamic State has become a truly global operation.
There are a number of developments that have contributed to the nature
of the threat the world faces today. These developments include the
withdrawal of U.S.-ledcoalition forces from Iraq in 2011 and the drawdown
from Afghanistan in 2014, the Arab Spring fallout in the Middle East, and
the flow of fighters in thousands from all over the world to Iraq and Syria,
among other places. More specifically, post-Arab Spring political chaos and
instability in the Middle East have enabled fledging, mostly marginalized,
groups to reorganize and pose threats to the security and stability of the
world.85
These developments have resulted in a substantial increase in the number
of Islamic jihadist groups in the world. These actors can conveniently be
divided into old actors and new actors. Perhaps the best example of an old
actor is Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, such as Al-Nusra Front.86 The old actors
are struggling to retain their prominence. New actors like the Islamic State,
are competing for supremacy and legitimacy in the global jihadist arena.87
As one commentator has noted, "this has polarized radical and violent
Muslim groups and individuals worldwide."88 Some groups have pledged
allegiance to the Islamic State, while others remain loyal to Al-Qaeda.89 At
the same time, the sectarian divide between Shiites and Sunnis within the
Muslim world has hardened significantly, leading to increasing levels of
violence in many countries.90
The Islamic State in particular has enjoyed affiliates that have pledged
allegiance. Perhaps the most striking example is the October 2015 downing
of a Russian passenger plane over Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, which killed 224
people.91 Although the Islamic State claimed responsibility, "a different
beast" caused the crash.92 The "different beast" was an Islamic State affiliate
that had pledged its loyalty to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the Islamic State's selfdeclared Caliph.93 The Islamic State calls these affiliate groups "wilayat,
Arabic for 'provinces.' "94
83. See Sedgwick, supra note 74.
84. Id.
85. See Rohan Gunaratna, Global Threat Assessment: New Threats on the Horizon?, CIAO Focus
(Jan/Feb. 2015), https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/27068/uploads.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See Daniel Byman, ISIS Goes Global, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mar./Apr. 2016), https://www
.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/isis-goes-global.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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The Islamic State's provinces are far-flung.95 If these provinces have
begun to align their actions with those of the Islamic State, then its
geographic reach has expanded extensively.96 This expanded reach poses a
serious threat to Western interests in that it makes local groups more deadly
in their regional conflicts.
The provinces of the Islamic State are quite a phenomenon. The center of
the Islamic State is in the Sunni-populated parts of Iraq and Syria, and it
splits headquarters between Mosul (Iraq) and Raqqa (Syria).97 But the
Islamic State claims to be the ruler of all Muslims, and it operates
throughout the Muslim world.98 "It has already declared wilayat in parts of
Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,
Yemen, and the Caucasus. Terrorists or fighters operating in Isis' name have
also conducted attacks in Bangladesh and Kuwait."99
One writer has identified Egypt and Libya as containing the "most
worrisome" provinces.100 The Egyptian affiliate, Sinai Province, at first
focused its attacks on Egypt's military and police.oi But it soon raised its
ambitions and went after UN targets, beheaded a Croatian expatriate
(supposedly in revenge for Croatia's participation in the international antiIsis coalition), and attacked the Italian consulate in Cairo.102 Then, as noted
above, they downed the Russian airliner.103
"The Libyan province emerged from the strife that followed the
overthrow of the Libyan dictator Muammar al-Qaddafi in 2011."104 The
U.S. Government's decision to support the rebels who overthrew the
Qaddafi regime was one of the worst decisions, in national security and
foreign policy terms, ever made by a U.S. administration and deserves some
consideration as a backdrop to the creation of the Libyan province.
The background to the creation of the Libyan province, at least for
purposes of this article, begins on March 17, 2011, when the UN Security
Council adopted Resolution 1973, with the administration of U.S. President
Barack Obama pushing hard for its adoption.105 The resolution authorized
military intervention in Libya.106 In explaining U.S. support for military
intervention, President Obama said it was necessary to save the lives of
peaceful, pro-democracy protesters who found themselves the target of a
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Byman, supra note 91.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Byman, supra note 91.
104. Id.
105. See Alan J. Kuperman, Obama's Libya Debacle: How a Well Meaning Intervention Ended in
Failure, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mar./Apr. 2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/libya/
obamas-libya-debacle.
106. Id.

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
126

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

[VOL. 50, NO. 1

crackdown by Libyan dictator Muammar al-Qaddafi.O7 Additionally, he
added that Qaddafi was posed to commit a bloodbath in the Libyan city
where the uprising had started.1os According to President Obama, "[w]e
knew that if we waited one more day, Benghazi-a city nearly the size of
Charlotte-could suffer a massacre that would have reverberated across the
region and stained the conscience of the world."109 Two days after the UN
authorization, the United States and other NATO countries established a
no-fly zone throughout Libya and started bombing Qaddafi's forces.11o
"Seven months later, in October 2011, after an extended military campaign
with sustained Western support, rebel forces conquered the country and
shot Qaddafi dead.""'
U.S. officials were triumphant after the military victory.112 Writing in
2012, Ivo Daalder, the then U.S. Permanent representative to NATO, and
James Stavidis, the then supreme allied commander of Europe, declared,
"NATO's operation in Libya has rightly been hailed as a model
intervention."13 In the Rose Garden after Qaddafi's death, President
Obama said, "without putting a single U.S. service member on the ground,
we achieved our objectives."14

The President's statement, however, raises a key question: What were the
Obama Administration's objectives? In a comment on Alan J. Kuperman's
article, Derek Chollet and Ben Fisherman argue that it was Qaddafi's
intransigence, and not NATO that turned the intervention from a mission to
protect into something that led to regime change."15
In a reply, however, Kuperman noted to the contrary that, "[t]he facts
show otherwise. Just three days into the bombing campaign, it was the
Obama administration that unilaterally terminated peace negotiations
between U.S. Africa Command and the Qaddafi regime."116 Kuperman also
raises some other, quite disturbing facts and developments:
The most repugnant part of Chollet and Fishman's response comes
when they blame Qaddafi for his own torture and execution. It was
because of the Libyan leader's refusal to acquiesce to NATO bombing,
they insist, that 'the way Qaddafi ended his rule-on the run and hiding
in a sewer pipe, before being killed-was inevitable.'
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See Kuperman, supra note 105.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Tom Cohen, Obama Pledges U.S. Support for Libya After Gadhafi, CNN (Oct. 20, 2011),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/20/us/gadhafi-reaction/.
115. See Derek Chollet and Ben Fishman, Who Lost Libya? A Close Call, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(May/June 2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/libya/2015-04-20/who-lost-libya.
116. See Kuperman, supra note 105.

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
20171

PRIMARY NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS FACING THE U.S.

127

Not so. This gruesome denouement was hardly inevitable. Instead, it
was the result of the Obama administration's serial errors: starting a war
of choice based on a faulty premise, exceeding the UN's mandate to
protect civilians, rejecting Qaddafi's peace offers, insisting on regime
change, and supporting an opposition composed of radical Islamists and
fractious militias.
After Qaddafi's death was confirmed in October 2011, a gloating
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared to a television reporter, 'We
came, we saw, he died!' She was justified in claiming credit on behalf of
the Obama administration for the outcome in Libya, including
Qaddafi's brutal murder. Back then, however, she and her colleagues
believed their intervention was a success. Now that it has turned into a
dismal failure, it is too late to shed responsibility. As President George
W. Bush learned the hard way, 'mission accomplished' can be declared,
but subsequent events may haunt you.1 7
It is important to note exactly what Secretary Clinton was gloating about:
the possible commission of three international crimes by the rebels aided
and abetted by the support of the U.S. government. Although the primary
reason supporting military intervention was that it was necessary to protect
civilians from attacks by Qaddafi forces, Kuperman seems to question this by
noting that, "striving to minimize civilian casualties, Qaddafi's forces had
refrained from indiscriminate violence."Its In sharp contrast, the rebels used
armed force indiscriminately, often deliberately targeting civilians, including
women and children, which would constitute an international crime.119 A
second possible international crime committed by the rebels was the alleged
torturing of Qaddafi after he was captured.120 Torture is prohibited by an
international conventionl21 and is a crime under U.S. law subject to criminal
penalties.122 The third possible international crime committed by the rebels
was the execution of Qaddafi.123
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Gordon Rayner, Rebels argued over whether to kill Gaddafi as he begged for his life,
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindian
ocean/libya/884202 1/Rebels-argued-over-whether-to-kill-Gaddafi-as-he-begged-for-his-life
.html.
121. The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N. S. 85, entered into force
for the United States in 1994.
122. See The Torture Convention Implementation Act of 1994; 18 U.S.C. Section 2340 et seq.
(2000). In Section 2340 A (b), Congress has established federal criminal jurisdiction over
torture committed or attempted outside the United States if: (1) the alleged offender is a
national of the United States, or (2) the alleged offender is present in the United States,
regardless of the nationality of the victim or alleged offender.
123. Rayner, supra note 120.
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Not surprisingly, the defeat of Qaddafi forces has been followed by chaos
and battles between militias seeking to come to power in Libya. It has also
been followed by increasingly successful efforts by the Islamic State to
expand in the country. As the Islamic State expands, the threat of
uncontrolled migration arises as people flee from the advancing Islamic State
forces. Libya's Mediterranean coast is a main departure point for migrants
to Southern Europe.
At this writing, after attending a conference in Vienna, the United States
and twenty other nation-states have pledged to consider training and arming
the Libyan government as it struggles to stop the Islamic State onslaught.124
The Islamic State currently controls the Mediterranean port of Sirte and in
recent weeks has gained territory in government-held areas.
It is perhaps ironic that the Islamic State is expanding the territory it holds
in Libya, because other recent reports indicate that elsewhere the Islamic
State is losing territory in the "grinding war in the Middle East."125 As a
result, the Islamic State is engaging less in pitched battles with the forces of
nation-states and turning instead to direct attacks on the softer target of
civilians, especially in the form of suicide bombings. For example, in three
straight days of bombings in Baghdad starting on May 11, 2016, they killed
more than 100 people.126 Such attacks minimize the casualties that the
Islamic State suffers compared with the number of people they kill and the
property damage they inflict. More important, these attacks may play an
important role in the Islamic State's propaganda efforts, as they are examples
of taking the fight to their enemies. This may help to counter the negative
impression given by reports of loss of territory by the Islamic State.
A happy development, from the perspective of the United States, Great
Britain, and other nation-states fighting against the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda,
and other forms of jihadism, is the election of Sadiq Khan as London's first
Muslim mayor in the early hours of May 7, 2016.127 Khan is the son of an
immigrant Pakistani bus driver. He is also a British citizen trained as a
lawyer, who has appeared on platforms with Islamic extremists as a human
rights lawyer defending them. British authorities report that at least 800
people have left the United Kingdom to fight for the Islamic State in Iraq
124. See Valentina Pop, Nations Weigh Arming Libyans, WALL ST. J. (May 17, 2016), http://www
.wsj.com/articles/kerry-foreign-ministers-hold-libya-talks-1463400980.
125. See Maria Abi-Habib, Islamic State Shifts Tactics From War-Fighting to Suicide Bombing,
WALL ST. J. (May 14, 2016), available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-state-shiftstactics-from-war-fighting-to-suicide-bombing-1463181100.
126. Liz Dearden, Baghdad Bombings: Isis Kills More Than 100 People in 24 Hours of Suicide
Attacks and Car Bombings in Iraq, INDEPENDENT (May 12, 2016), http://www.independent.co
.uk/news/world/middle-east/baghdad-bombings-isis-kills-more-than- 100-people-in-24-hourssuicide-attacks-car-bombings-iraq-a7025 866.html.
127. For an excellent article on Mr. Khan's victory and his background and qualifications, see
Mark Leftly, Citizen Khan: London's first Muslim mayor aims to be an "antidote" to Islamic
extremism, TIME (May 23, 2016), available at http://www.ramclaughlin.com/mag/Assorted%20
Magazines%20Bundle%20-%20May%2019%202016%20(True%20PDF)/Time%20Magazine
%20-%20May%2023,%202016.pdf.
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and Syria, but nearly half of these largely young fighters have returned,
raising fears that some could be plotting terrorist attacks on home turf.128
London has been hit at least twice by Islamic terrorism-first in the bus and
subway bombings of July 7, 2005, which killed fifty-two people, and again in
2013, when a twenty-five year old soldier was hacked to death near his
barracks in Greenwich.129 Khan is well aware of the need to respond to such
terrorism and suggests that he is highly qualified to do so:
I am a Londoner, I'm British, I'm of Islamic faith, Asian origin,
Pakistani heritage, so whether it's Daesh [Arabic for Islamic State] or
these others who want to destroy our way of life and talk about the
West, they're talking about me. What better antidote to the hatred
they spew than someone like me being in this position?130

It seems highly likely that there is no better antidote to Islamic extremism
than Mayor Khan. It is also likely that there are few if any other antidotes to
Islamic extremism that are Mayor Khan's equal. The sad reality has been
that the response of moderate Muslims to Islamic extremism has, on the
whole, been grossly inadequate. It is unrealistic to expect the U.S.
government or the governments of other Western nation-states to fill this
gap. Mayor Khan's participation in the fight against Islamic extremism is
most welcome, but it will not be enough by itself. The hope is that he will
convince other Muslim leaders to join the "antidote" movement against
Islamic extremism.
This Islamic extremism is aided by the support given to the Islamic State
Caliphate by a number of mosques in Western countries, especially in
Australia, the United Kingdom, and Canada.131 Although such efforts might
raise complex free speech issues, governments need to consider the
possibility of criminalizing acts of advocating, supporting, and inciting
religious hatred or participating in conflicts overseas, as well as promoting
coexistence, moderation, and tolerance through schools, youth
organizations, and strategic communications platforms.
The Middle East has been the primary focus of Islamic extremism, and
indeed of media attention.132 Recently, however, there has been more focus
on North and Central Africa, especially on increased collaboration between
Boko Haram, which has its primary base of operations in Nigeria, and the

128. Who are Britain'sfihadists, BBC (Aug. 12, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-32026985.
129. Lee Rigby Murder: Woolwich Tributes to Soldier, BBC (May 22, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/
news/uk-england-london-27518078.
130. See Leftly, supra note 127.
131. See Gunaratna,supra note 85, at 7.
132. FrailArab States: The war within, EcONOMIST, May 14, 2016, at 7-8; The Arab world: The
class within a civilisation, EcONOMIST (May 14, 2016) at 3-16, available at http://www.economist
.com/sites/default/files/20160514 the arab world.pdf.

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
130

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

[VOL. 50, NO. 1

Islamic State.133 Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in
2015. As The New York Times has accurately summarized,
In recent years the [African] continent has increasingly become a
battleground in the West's war against militant Islam. [Obama]
[a]dministration officials insist that the increased influence of groups
like Boko Haram, and now the Islamic State, has some of its roots in the
economic disparities and human sufferings often brought on by
authoritarian governments in which strongmen often cling to power.
But at the same time, the United States is supporting such governments
as they battle Boko Haram and other extremist groups. In the Lake
Chad area, which includes countries like Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and
Cameroun, American Special Operations forces are training and
advising African militaries in the fight against Boko Haram, Al Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb, and now the Islamic State.34
Boko Haram's actions are often as horrific as those of Al-Qaeda or the
Islamic State. For example, Boko Haram is increasingly using children,
especially girls, to deliver its explosive packages to markets.35 They often
drug young girls, wrap them in explosives, and send them into crowds.136
Their assumption is that when their victims see a female child, they will not
suspect that she could be carrying a bomb.137
The Pentagon is reportedly putting forth a proposal that would allocate
$200 million this year to help train and equip the armies and security forces
of North, Central, and West African countries.138 The United States is also
constructing a $50 million drone base in Agadez, Niger, that will allow
Reaper surveillance aircraft to fly over the Lake Chad Area.139
The influence and the actions of the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda continue
to spread on a worldwide basis. In Southeast Asia, for example, the impact
of the Islamic State was especially felt in Indonesia and Malaysia, with a
number of their citizens either joining the fight in Iraq or Syria or recruiting
fighters for one or both of these countries.140
133. See Helene Cooper, Boko Haram and ISIS Are CollaboratingMore, U.S. Militay Says, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 21, 2016), at AS, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/21/world/africa/boko-haramand-isis-are-collaborating-more-us-military-says.html?_r=0.
134. Id.
135. Brent Swails & David McKenzie, Kidnapped to Kill: How Boko Haram is Turning Girls into
Weapons, CNN (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/12/africa/cameroon-bokoharam-child-bombers/.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Eric Schmitt, U.S. Scrambles to Contain Growing his Threat in Libya, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/22/world/africa/us-scrambles-to-contain-growingisis-threat-in-libya.html.
139. Id.
140. See Gunaratna,supra note 85, at 6.
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Tunisia constitutes an especially interesting but frustrating case.141 "In the
first days of 2011, thousands of young people from the suburbs poured into
downtown Tunis to demand the ouster of the country's corrupt and
autocratic leader, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali."142 And "[w]ithin two weeks, he
had been overthrown in what became known as the 'Jasmine Revolution."143
To further quote the journalist George Packer, "[t]his sudden change was
soon celebrated around the world as the first sprout of the Arab Spring."144
"Before the revolution, Tunisia had been kept rigidly secular."45 But after
the revolution, "[t]he black flag of radical Islam flew over many buildings,
and hard-liners known as Salafis-the work refers to the original followers
of the Prophet Muhammad-took advantage of the new openness and tried
to impose Sharia in their neighborhoods."146

Then, in 2013, the Salafis were faced with a state crackdown.47 After,
they soon went underground and began disappearing from their
neighborhoods in Tunisia.148 People left to fight in Syria and Iraq and to
join the Islamic State in Libya. The main reasons some people gave for
leaving were reportedly "marginalization and joblessness."149 In the words of
a young man who was asked why he was joining the Islamic State, replied,
"'I can't build anything in this country. But the Islamic State gives us the
chance to create, to build bombs, to use technology.'"o50 In July 2013 this
young man blew himself up in a suicide bombing in Iraq.15
Many of the young people who left Tunisia to join one Islamic jihadist
group or another adopted the ruthless behavior of their particular group.
For example, a young local man named Maghraoui went to Syria and joined
Al-Nusra Front, Al-Qaeda's affiliate there.152 In 2010, he returned home to
tell war stories at his favorite caf6.153 He then went back and joined the
Islamic State.54 Last February, he became famous in Tunisia when a video
was posted to YouTube showing him help capture Moaz al-Kasasbeh, a
Jordanian Air Force Pilot, who was then burned alive.55 Maghraoui was
killed in September, in an American air strike.156
141. George Packer, Exporting]ihad: The Arab Spring has given Tunisians the freedom to act on
their unhappiness, THE NEW YORKER (Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/
2016/03/2 8/tunisia-and-the-fall-after-the-arab-spring.
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Tunisia has managed to establish a semblance of a democracy, although
much more remains to be done. In the meantime, police continue with their
beatings, and other forms of oppression.'57 Also, young people continue to
leave Tunisia to engage in jihad in other countries. "It is estimated that
between six and seven thousand Tunisians have gone to Syria and Iraq to
wage jihad."158
III.

Complexity Compounded: The Case of Syria

In its previous sections, this article focused first on nation-states that
arguably constitute primary national security threats to the United States
and then on non-nation-state Islamic jihadist threats like the Islamic State,
Al-Qaeda, and Boko Haram. In this section, however, we turn to Syria and
its crisis, which involves an unusual mix of participants, including the U.S.
and Russian governments, and various Islamic jihadists.
When the so-called Arab Spring protests broke out in the Middle East,
unlike countries like Tunisia and Egypt, whose reaction, at least at first, was
to permit the protests to continue, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad
suppressed the protests with heavy armed force. This set off a vicious civil
war and as of early 2005 more than 200,000 people had been killed, a million
had been injured, and more than three million Syrians fled the country,
according to the United Nations.159 Jonathan Tepperman, the managing
editor of ForeignAffairs, suggested in an interview with President Assad, that
Syria increasingly was divided into three mini-states: one controlled by the
government, one controlled by ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra, and one controlled
by the more secular Sunni and Kurdish opposition.160

President Assad

responded by denying that these groups were mini-states, and instead
labeled them as factions that are not stable and have no clear lines of
separation between different forces. Tepperman next noted that Hezbollah,
Iran's Quids Force, and Iranian-trained Shiite militias were all playing
significant roles in the fight against rebels in Syria and asked whether Assad
was worried about Iran's influence over his country. In response, Assad
claimed that Iran didn't have any ambitions in Syria, and that Syria would
not allow any country to influence its sovereignty; Syria would allow
cooperation with Iran. By contrast, he suggested, the United States and the
rest of the West want to have influence without cooperation.161

In 2015 Russia intervened in Syria. According to The Economist, posters
hanging at Russian army installations throughout Syria state "Russian armed
157. Debra Del Pistoia & Lamia Ledrisi, Tunisia's Fight Against Its Revolutionary Youth, OPEN
(Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/debora-delpistoia-lamia-ledrisi/tunisia-s-fight-against-its-revolutionary-youth.
158. Packer, supra note 141.
159. Id.
160. See Jonathan Tepperman, Syria's President Speaks: A Conversation with Bashar al-Assad, 94
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forces are the guarantor of world security."162 Furthermore, The Economist
reports that when Russian forces intervened in Syria, they sought to provide
television spectacles for the masses at home, re-establishing itself as a global
power and forcing the West to account for Russian interests. Last March
Mr. Putin said that "the main part" of Russia's forces could now leave Syria,
their mission having been accomplished. But as The Economist explained,
[t]he curious thing about Russia's withdrawal. . . is that it has not

actually happened. To leave would be to hand Syria over to Mr. Assad's
other ally, Iran. Rather than withdrawing his forces, Mr. Putin has
retrenched. The March announcement was really 'a way to
reconceptualize the presence as permanent, rather than as part of a
specific mission,' says Dimitry Gorenburg, an expert on the Russian
armed forces. Russia did recall a handful of aircraft-a signal to Syria's
stubborn president, Bashar al-Assad, not to take it for granted. But its
footprint in Syria remains heavy.163

Both Russia and the United States are engaged in heavy bombing in Syria,
but often they are targeting different targets. The United States has
refrained from targeting the Syrian forces, although they are strongly in
favor of the removal of President Assad from power, because Russia is still
strongly supporting keeping Assad in power. Both the United States and
Russia favor bombing the Islamic State or Al Qaeda, but Syria and Russia
have often targeted moderate rebels favored by the United States. Assad has
tried to "convince the world that he is fighting jihadists rather than his own
angry citizens."164 His bombing of moderate rebels has helped to drive many
of them into the arms of the Islamic State or other extremists.165 Russia and

the United States have been trying hard to arrange and maintain a ceasefire
and then a negotiated settlement of the conflict, but are having problems
bringing this about.

IV.

Some Brief Closing Observations

China and Russia individually constitute formidable adversaries for the
United States and the Western countries. Acting together in a formal
alliance, China and Russia would be even more formidable adversaries and
greater threats to the national security. There has been some speculation
that China and Russia are moving in this direction.166
162. The Withdrawal that Wasn't, ECONOMIST (May 14, 2016), http://www.economist.com/
news/europe/2 1698688 -syria-still-provides-useful-stage-russian-strategyand-propaganda-with
drawal-wasn't.
163. Id.
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166. See, e.g., Dingding Chen, Are China and Russia Moving toward a Formal Alliance, THE
DIPLOMAT (May 30, 2014), http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/are-china-and-russia-movingtoward-a-formal-alliance/; Andranik Migranyan, Washington's Creation:A Russia-ChinaAlliance?,
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There is no question that China and Russia have taken steps that they
believe will benefit them both, especially by increasing their international
status and influence. There are also, however, still obstacles in the way of
their creating a formal alliance. Some of the developments that point to a
closer relationship between the two countries include, among others, their
entering into a huge national gas deal in 2014 that is worth about $400
billion.167 They also conducted a joint naval drill in the East China Sea,
which sends a deterrence message to Japan and the United States.168 China
and Russia vetoed a draft UN Security Council resolution that would have
sent Syria to the International Criminal Court for an investigation of alleged
war crimes.1 69 China and Russia had previously vetoed three UN Security
Council resolutions condemning Syria.170
Some of the obstacles to a formal China/Russian alliance are historical
mistrust, the lack of a common threat, and conflicting interests in Central
Asia. Moreover, China could be dragged into an unnecessary war by Russia,
and Russia is unwilling to be China's junior partner in the relationship.
Hence, unless the United States makes a strategic mistake that both China
and Russia believe threatens them, it is unlikely there will be a formal
alliance between China and Russia in the near future.
When it comes to the Islamic State and other Islamic jihadist threats,
however, as we have seen, through the creation of its so-called provinces and
its highly effective propaganda, the Islamic State has succeeded in spreading
its threat worldwide and expanding and strengthening its military might.
Nonetheless, Barron's has recently published a lengthy article arguing that:
"An unlikely coalition of the U.S., Russia, Iraq, Syria, Israel, Iran and Saudi
Arabia will continue to take territory from ISIS. The endgame should come
next year. Terrorist threats are sure to persist, particularly in Europe."171 As
a result, "ISIS will fall soon."172
But the Islamic State and other Islamic jihadists have shown themselves to
be nothing if not resilient. They are also flexible in terms of willingness to
change tactics and strategy. Recently, they have shifted their focus to suicide
bombings in markets that have killed large numbers of people, especially in
(July 10, 2014), http://nationalinterest.org/feature/washingtonscreation-russia-china-alliance- 10843.
167. William Wan & Abigail Hauslohner, China, Russia Sign $400 Billion Gas Deal, THE WASH.
POST (May 21, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/china-russia-sign-400billion-gas-deal/2014/05/21/364e9e74-e0de-11e3 -8dcc-d6b7fede08 la-story.html.
168. Chris Buckley, Russia to Join China in Naval Exercise in Disputed South China Sea, N.Y.
TIMES (Jul. 29, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/29/world/asia/russia-china-southchina-sea-naval-exercise.html.
169. Ian Black, Russia and China Veto UN Move to Refer Syria to International Criminal Court,
THE GUARDIAN (May 22, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/22/russiachina-veto-un-draft-resolution-refer-syria-international-criminal-court.
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.com/articles/islamic-state-defeat-in-2017-1461990736.
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Iraq. My suspicion is that in the end the most effective response to the
barbarism of Islamic jihadism will be greatly improved opposition on the
part of moderate Muslims like the new Mayor of London, aided with better
coordination among the "unlikely coalition" of countries, with the United
States leading from the front rather than the rear.
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